The Employment Act of 1946 mandated that the federal government take an active role in promoting "maximum employment, production, and purchasing power." Yet it failed to establish specific goals and a specific modus operandi. It was left to Congress and the administration to set the goals and to the economics profession-in particular the Council of Economic Advisors-to derive the policy strategy. Over the years this has resulted in a vast amount of research concerned with macroeconomic stabilization policy. Topics studied include the effect of lags on optimal policy, the use of discretion or judgment versus explicit rules, the relative strength of fiscal and monetary policy, the use of feedback rules versus nonfeedback rules, the optimal banking structure, and the role of intermediate targets.
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It is not our purpose here to review this research nor to prescribe a way of conducting policy. Rather, it is to describe and defend a meaningful framework for studying these and other questions concerning stabilization policy.
An accepted framework for thinking about most decision-making problems has three elements:
-The goals or objectives or, more technically, the objective function. -The constraints or, in several different words, the opportunity set, the set of attainable outcomes, or the model. -The optimal policy or the best course of action, which is the solution to the problem: maximize the objective function subject to the constraint or model. In Section I we consider some theoretical examples to illustrate how this framework might be applied to issues in stabilization policy. In Section II we assess some current policy issues to demonstrate that this framework provides a rich mode of analysis and that it directs attention toward sensible questions.
I. The Policy Framework
Our examples center around a relatively simple objective function and an aggregate macroeconomic model. The examples differ mainly with respect to the degree of uncertainty embedded in the model.
Assume the policy maker's goal is to control income (Y). In particular, the policy maker wants to maintain a level of income (Y) over some fixed horizon (t=2 1 N). An example of an objective function which expresses such a concern is
The problem is to find the time path of the variable the policy maker controls -referred to as the policy instrument and assumed here to be the interest rate (r) -which maximizes the objective function U. To do this we must have some notion, that is, some model, which embodies the economic process of income determination and, just as importantly, links this process to the policy instrument. For purposes of illustration, we use a model which is a version of the one that appears in introductory macro texts. It consists of the following equations:
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here Yĩs income, Cĩs consumption, It is investment, and rt and 4ãre
the current rate and the expected future rate of interest, respectively. Equation (2) is a simple linear version of a consumption equation which states that current consumption is equal to a constant (a1) plus a fraction (a2) of last period's income. Equation (3) is a linear version of an investment equation which states that current investment is equal to a positive function of the expected future rate of interest (J 3 1 1r~+1) plus a negative function of the current rate (J 32). We initially assume expectations are fixed and treat f3~as a constant; later we relax this assumption and examine the policy implications. Equation (4) defines income as the sum of consumption plus investment. A model, in effect, is a description of an opportunity set or a set of attainable outcomes. The implied opportunity set of the model set forth in (2) through (4) is readily found by substituting (2) and (3) Using the objective function (1) and various versions of the opportunity set (5), we are now ready to derive optimal rules: the settings of the policy instrument (7'~for t1,.. . ,N) that maximize (1) subject to the constraints imposed by the model. More specifically, the plan is to consider five different versions of (5) . In the first, we assume all parameters are known and specify that a7 is zero so that (5) reduces to a static, deterministic model. In the second, we let a, take on a nonzero value so that (5) is dynamic but still deterministic. In the third and fourth versions, we add parameter uncertainty: the third being the static case, the fourth being dynamic. In the last version, we relax the assumption of fixed expectationsÃ
. A Static, Deterministic Model
Here we assume that the policy maker knows the coefficients of the model and, specifically, that a2 0. Equation (5) then reduces to
Since the model is deterministic and static, the problem reduces to finding the value of rt, for any arbitrary period, which produces the desired level of income. This model is static because the current setting of the instrument affects only current income. It is deterministic because we have assumed the coefficients 62, a2, and /32 are known. The optimal setting for r1 (i~)is found by substituting Y* for Yt in (5') and solving for rt. This yields
Notice that in every period we achieve Y* exactly and that P~is the same.
B. A Dynamic, Deterministic Model
Again assume the policy maker knows the coefficients, but now assume a2 is not equal to zero. Equation (5) represents the opportunity set
Since the parameters 8,, a2, and /3, are known, the model is deterministic, but it is dynamic in the sense that past income affects current and thus future income. From the policy point of view, however, it is only dynamic in a trivial way. As in the static model, we are always able to exactly hit the target income, and the optimal value of the instrument is unchanged over time. This is readily seen by looking at the first period decision,
where Y0 is some initial value of income. The optimal value of r1 is (7) r (Y-6-,a,Y)/J3, which produces Y1 = Y'~Now for t2, . . . ,N, the optimal value for rt is
. A Static, Stochastic Model In the previous examples we assumed the policy maker knew the coefficients. In general, since economic structures must be estimated from finite data sets, we are not so lucky. Instead, we must deal with stochastic models where the policy maker is in the position of choosing among alternative actions, consequences of which are uncertain. There is a well-developed theory of choice in such circumstances, which states that under highly plausible axioms the decision maker should rank actions on the basis of their expected utilitiest The problem of finding the optimal policy is then one of finding the policy rule which maximizes the expected value of the preference function subject to the structural relationships defined by a stochastic model of the economic process.
Consider again the case where a2 =0 but where the other parameters are unknown and must be estimated from a finite data set. With a2 0, our model is static, and to determine optimal policy for any given period, we need only to maximize the expected utility of a one-period utility function. (The quantity~is the mean value of the interest rate over the estimation period, and m is the number of observations. It follows from (9) that Y equal to~+~,7isthe mean value of income over the estimation period.) From (9) and (10) we see that if we set rt lower than~we would predict higher than average income but at the expense of some additional uncertainty about our forecast. Only if we set t~equal to~or equivalently equate the desired level of income Y* to the average income level over the data period Y, do we minimize forecast variance. This tradeoff, or opportunity set, is represented in the figure by the curve AB. Point Z, where requals~is the point of minimum variance; the forecasted value of income is the mean value over the data period. One of the major conclusions resulting from this model is that the more uncertainty about the impact of policy (the greater oj), the closer the policy instrument rt should be set to its mean level Tover the estimation periodt This is readily seen by substituting (9) and (10) into (1'), taking the derivative with respect to rt, setting the derivative to zero, and solving for the optimal value of rt. This yields
As a~becomes larger, ceteris paribus, the deviation between iãndb ecomes smaller.
D. A Stochastic, Dynamic Model
Finding the optimal policy begins to get more complicated when we incorporate both uncertainty and lags into the framework. In general, the solution to the problem exists, yet technically it is difficult to derive. The difficulties arise because not only is there a contemporaneous tradeoff between forecast and forecast variance, but there is also a more complex tradeoff over time.
To illustrate, consider the opportunity set
Here we again assume 6, and/3, have to be estimated, but now we let a2 be some positive known coefficient. Again assuming rt is exogenous over the data period, the variance of forecasted income is given by (10); thus, by (10) and (11) we still have a contemporaneous tradeoff. But we also have a tradeoff over time, since by (11) any decision made last period affecting Y~, affects this period's opportunity set. Consequently, the optimal rule must take account of the dynamic nature of the decisionmaking problem, and this usually makesthe rule more difficult to deriveẼ
. An Endogenous Expectations Model
We began these examples by assuming that the expectation of the future rate of interest was fixed (recall /3i~13r~+i). We now relax this assumption and briefly discuss its policy implications. Suppose the expectation of future rates is a function of the current rate. This implies that when we solve for the optimal rule, we can no longer treat[31 as fixed. It will change in some systematic way with different settings of the policy instrument.
tThts conclusion does not follow, however, when a change in rt produces information about the structure that outweighs the cost of higher variance.
As a result, the optimization problem is somewhat more complicated. Essentially, it involves estimating the expectations function and solving the model with /3~as an endogenous variable.
A major result of endogenizing expectations is that if expectations are correct on average, there exists a class of models in which the policy rule will have no "real" effects~Whether or not expectations are correct on average, however, if they are functions of the policy rules, using models with fixed expectations may seriously misrepresent the impact of policy.T o summarize, we have analyzed several versions of a simple macro model. They differed mainly in degree of uncertainty embedded in the economic process. This analysis not only illustrated the framevvork set out at the beginning of this paper, but also established the following policy implications:
-Given an objective function and a model, finding the optimal rule is a technical problem, although possibly one that is difficult to solve. -The degree of difficulty is directly related to the degree of uncertainty about the economic process. -The more uncertainty, the less the optimal setting of the policy instrument deviates from its historical mean. -If expectations are functions of the policy rule, using models with fixed expectations may seriously misrepresent the impact of policy.
II. Some Current Policy Issues
The proposed framework consists of an objective function, an opportunity set or model, and a rule which maximizes the objective function subject to the opportunity set. Within this mode of analysis, many policy issues can be clarified and many, in principle at least, can be resolved. We now examine some of these issues in an attempt to defend and to illustrate the usefulness of the framework.
A. The Role ofJudgment or Discretion in the Polic,y Process
This framework, many economists and policy makers contend, is fine in theory, but not in practice. The real world, they argue, is too complicated to model. Any rule resulting from such a model should be supplemented by whatever information and judgment is not part of the formal structure. Although the phrases "too complicated" and "information and judgment not part of the formal structure" are commonly used in such criticisms, the meaning of these phrases often varies. In responding to this criticism, therefore, we consider different interpretations.
"Too complicated" seems to imply too much uncertainty. But if it tSee Sargent and Wallace 171.
lSee Lucas [41. means that the economic process contains no systematic relationships, then judgment can fare no better than formal models. Similarly, if it refers to unforeseen one-time economic shocks -an oil embargo, for example -then while models estimated on past data have little to offer the policy maker, neither does thejudgmental methodt On the other hand, if "too complicated" refers to uncertainty about systematic relationships that hold on average, then, as we demonstrated in Section I this type of randomness can be incorporated into the framework. We have argued that if uncertainty cannot be modeled formally, we cannot judgmentally improve the policy process. But what about using "information and judgment not part of the formal structure" to improve policy? Again, we consider various interpretations. Using information not part of the model may mean that some key equations are missing or that, because most models contain aggregate relationships, more information exists than they can analyze. Both of these interpretations are criticisms of the current state of model building. In principle, however, these models can be expanded to include all known systematic relationships and can be estimated on a disaggregated level consistent with the data.
Another interpretation of using judgment, which we believe to be the more common, is that of using the expertise of the experienced forecaster. This forecaster is supposed to have deep and intuitive insights into the workings of the economy which enable production, on average, of more accurate predictions than explicit models. But how can we choose an optimal strategy based on a single forecast? We need to know the implications of many different strategies. Morever, if we cannot reproduce and test the "expert's" forecasting techniques, there is no possibility for learning and little for empirical verification.
Thus, we conclude that framework cannot be dismissed simply on grounds that the economy is too complicated or that intuition works better. If there is a role for discretionary policy or judgment, it must be made explicit and part of the formal structure.
If we can agree, at least in principle, that we can construct a model that can take account of all relevant information and that explains economic data, then with such a model a number of other issues can be resolved.
B. Fiscal Vs. Monetary Policy
Consider the fiscal versus monetary policy debate. Fiscal policy, monetarists argue, has much less effect on aggregate income than monetary tTo illustrate, consider two of the judgmental policy prescriptions made in response to the price increase which followed the 1973 oil embargo. One was to have a once and for all matching increase in the money supply so that monetary policy would not become unduly restrictive. Another was no change in the money supply, since any increase would only further increase the price level. Which policy should have been followed? Without previous experience and some kind of model, it's difficult to say. policy. Advocates of fiscal policy reverse the ordering. But within the decision framework presented above, this controversy seems to be irrelevant. In general, if there is more than one policy instrument, both will be used.
C. Fixed Vs. Feedback Rules
Another argument which seems to lose its relevance is that due to long and variable lags, the impact of policy is so uncertain that it is best to have a fixed rule. Long and variable lags, it can be shown, are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for ruling out feedback rules. As long as the uncertainty about lag responses is not infinite, a feedback rule is optimal.
The controversy between fixed rules and feedback rules, however, is still a meaningful issue and one which can be addressed conceptually within this framework. The answer, it turns out, depends critically on the way expectations are modeled. In particular, if expectations of future variables are formed "rationally," that is, the forecasts of these variables are on average correct, then there exists a class of models in which a fixed rule is as good as any feedback rule; and this class of models includes most of the models found in the macroeconomic literatureD
. The Optimal Monetary Framework
The optimal monetary instrument and the optimal banking structure are two other issues that can be addressed within this framework. Both, however, are only interesting in a stochastic model.
On determining the optimal instrument, the policy maker is assumed to have the choice of setting either the rate of interest or the money stock. Determining which instrument yields the higher expected value of the objective function when it is set optimally resolves the issueÕ n determining the optimal banking structure, there are a host of issues. They include whether or not we should increase or decrease reserve requirements, equalize reserve requirements between deposit types, equalize reserve requirements between different classes of banks, and finally, whether or not we should tie the discount rate to a market rate. Again given the appropriate stochastic model, these are sensible questions and, in principle, can be answered.Ẽ
. The Role of Intermediate Targets
The models we consider contain some variables which are directly controlled by the policy maker (instrument variables), some which appear in the policy makers' utility function (goal variables), and some that may be influenced by policy but do not appear in the utility We have examined several policy issues and have seen how the framework advocated in this paper helps to clarify and possibly resolve these issues. Although current research has only scratched the surface on these policy debates, if we are to have any hope of eventually fulfilling the mandate of the Employment Act of 1946, we must adopt an explicit decision-making framework. Vague pronouncements about achieving full employment with price stability, so-called experienced forecasters, arid ad hoc policy prescriptions must be replaced bya specific objective function, an explicit model of the economy, and the implied best rule.
fSee Kareken et at.. op. cit.
